Role of Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) in Pharma Research

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ABSTRACT

The pharmaceutical industry has long faced challenges related to transparency, inefficiencies in drug discovery, and centralized decision-making structures. Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs), enabled by blockchain technology, offer a transformative model for managing collaborative research, funding, intellectual property (IP) governance, and clinical data transparency. This manuscript explores the conceptual foundation of DAOs, their historical relevance to pharmaceutical innovation, and their potential to democratize research efforts by aligning stakeholders through token-based voting, smart contracts, and trustless data sharing. By examining technological capabilities and academic discourse, this study critically analyzes the suitability of DAO structures for clinical trials, open drug discovery, and decentralized funding of neglected disease research. The literature review surveys early blockchain experimentation, collaborative research networks, and open science platforms. The methodology includes a qualitative assessment of case analogs, simulated DAO frameworks for pharma use, and stakeholder analysis. Results indicate that DAO models could improve transparency, cost-effectiveness, and participation diversity in pharma R&D. However, practical implementation was limited before 2015 due to technological immaturity and regulatory ambiguity. This paper concludes by positioning DAOs as a viable future framework for ethical and distributed pharmaceutical innovation.

KEYWORDS

DAOs, pharmaceutical research, blockchain, decentralized governance, open science, smart contracts, drug discovery, clinical trials, research funding, intellectual property

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INTRODUCTION

The pharmaceutical research sector has traditionally been governed by large corporations and centralized institutions that manage the full cycle from discovery to distribution. This system, while successful in producing many breakthrough drugs, has been critiqued for its inefficiencies, opaqueness, and prioritization of profit over social value. Simultaneously, the rise of blockchain technology introduced the concept of Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs)—community-governed structures operating via transparent smart contracts that eliminate intermediaries.

A DAO is a digital entity that runs through coded rules on a blockchain, enabling participants to make decisions collectively, often by using tokens for governance and incentives. In pharma research, where multi-stakeholder collaboration and transparent data-sharing are vital yet difficult to coordinate, DAOs offer a compelling alternative to the hierarchical management of innovation pipelines.

Although full-scale DAO implementation in pharmaceutical research remained largely theoretical before 2015, early academic and technical works explored blockchain-based ledgers for clinical trial records, crowdsourced

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funding models, and decentralized open-access platforms for biomedical research. This manuscript evaluates these ideas through the lens of DAO principles, arguing that such structures could fundamentally transform how pharmaceutical research is initiated, validated, and monetized.



Source: https://dev.to/3scava1i3r/what-s-a-decentralized-autonomous-organisation-dao-6dj

LITERATURE REVIEW

1. Centralized Challenges in Pharma Research

Pharmaceutical R&D has historically faced issues of data silos, low transparency, and duplicative research. Largescale studies have shown that over 50% of clinical trial data remained unpublished or delayed, affecting reproducibility and public trust. Furthermore, IP protection mechanisms often limited collaboration, especially in pre-competitive drug discovery phases.

Authors such as Light and Warburton (2011) described the "hidden business model" in Big Pharma that inflates costs and suppresses innovation. Moreover, the innovation ecosystem showed bias toward high-profit diseases rather than high-need diseases, such as tropical or orphan diseases.

2. Introduction of Blockchain for Transparency and Trust

Blockchain, the technology underpinning Bitcoin, began gaining academic attention for non-financial uses by 2013. Scholars proposed its use in timestamping research, securing clinical trial logs, and enabling transparent data access. Works by Swan (2014) and others explored how decentralized ledgers could enable "Blockchain HealthTech," which includes blockchain-based biomedical recordkeeping and collaborative platforms for open science.

Smart contracts, first discussed by Szabo in the 1990s and formalized with early Ethereum discussions around 2014–2015, provided the foundation for DAOs. A smart contract is a self-executing code that runs on the blockchain, enforcing conditions without the need for intermediaries.

3. Emergence of DAO Theory in Academic Circles

While Ethereum's launch in mid-2015 marked the first implementation of general-purpose smart contracts, the DAO concept was already being debated theoretically in decentralized governance circles. For instance, Buterin (2014) described DAOs as entities that mimic corporate structures—boards, charters, voting—without central leadership. This vision aligns well with the collaborative and modular nature of pharmaceutical research, where multiple parties—from labs to patient groups—can participate in shared goals.

4. Early Proposals for DAO-like Structures in Science

Projects like Science Commons, Open Source Pharma, and Synapse (from Sage Bionetworks) began proposing open data ecosystems for health research. While not DAOs in a technical sense, these initiatives embraced similar principles: decentralization, open access, and community governance. They served as philosophical and structural precursors to fully autonomous research collectives.

In particular, Open Source Pharma advocated for community-driven drug development, where protocols, results, and even IP were transparently shared. Their proposals for global "public labs" resonate with the DAO idea of community-driven R&D where token incentives could be used instead of patents.

5. Governance and Funding in DAOs for Pharma

The governance structure of DAOs, often based on token-weighted voting, presents an opportunity to democratize decision-making in pharma funding. Academic discussions before 2015 suggested that tokenization could replace traditional grant distribution methods, enabling researchers to propose projects directly to a decentralized funding body.

Decentralized crowdfunding models—such as Giveth and BitFund before full DAOs emerged—also provided early insight into collective decision-making via blockchain. The integration of such models into a research DAO could allow neglected or unconventional projects to find support without institutional gatekeeping.

6. Intellectual Property and Open Collaboration

One of the largest barriers to collaborative pharma research has been IP protection. Traditional patent systems encourage secrecy, delaying disclosure until IP is secured. DAO models could introduce "open IP" structures using licenses embedded in smart contracts. This could allow researchers to share results while receiving micro-payments or token rewards based on usage metrics recorded on-chain.

Decentralized timestamping services such as Proof of Existence also showed promise for protecting research claims without proprietary secrecy, making them useful tools in a DAO-governed research environment.

7. Clinical Trial Integrity and Patient Involvement

Trust in clinical trials can be enhanced through transparent data logging, one of the core promises of blockchain technology. DAOs could also empower patient communities through participatory governance. Before 2015, initiatives like PatientsLikeMe illustrated the feasibility of patient-led research networks. A DAO-based clinical trial system could allow patients to vote on trial priorities, improve consent transparency, and participate in data sharing decisions.

METHODOLOGY

This manuscript adopts a qualitative exploratory methodology focusing on scenario analysis, theoretical modeling, and analogical case review of DAO principles as they relate to pharmaceutical research ecosystems prior to August 2015. Since fully implemented DAOs were non-existent in the pharma context before this date, the research leans on speculative modeling, comparative analysis with DAO-like systems, and literature-backed feasibility assessments.

1. Theoretical Framework Construction

We first construct a conceptual framework by identifying the key functional requirements in pharmaceutical research:

• Stakeholder coordination (researchers, funders, patients, regulators),

- Transparent and tamper-proof recordkeeping (clinical trials, preclinical data),
- Resource allocation (grant disbursement, equipment access),
- Intellectual property governance,
- Outcome validation and reproducibility.

For each domain, we identify how a DAO—defined as a rule-based, smart contract-driven, token-governed organization—can support these functions. This involved mapping blockchain capabilities, such as distributed consensus and timestamping, to existing needs in pharma research.

2. Comparative Case Analysis

Given the absence of formal DAOs in pharma before 2015, we examine case analogs:

- Sage Bionetworks' Synapse platform for collaborative science;
- Open Source Pharma for open-access clinical models;
- Bitcoin and early altcoins for distributed governance experiments;
- GitHub and open-source models for decentralized coordination and versioning.

Each was assessed for structural elements that align with DAO features, such as permissionless access, rule enforcement by code, and distributed decision-making.

3. Hypothetical Simulation

We outline hypothetical simulations of DAO operation in pharma research:

- Clinical Trial DAO: Smart contracts are deployed to handle trial phases, data sharing, and patient consents.
- **Drug Discovery DAO**: Token holders vote on compound research priorities, and funding is disbursed upon milestone verification.
- **IP Management DAO**: Research outputs are uploaded with cryptographic proof and timestamping, with attribution tracked via blockchain.

These simulations are evaluated for feasibility based on pre-2015 blockchain capabilities (e.g., Ethereum whitepaper features, smart contract prototypes).

4. Stakeholder Interviews (Literature-Based)

Finally, published interviews and articles from stakeholders (researchers, developers, ethicists) discussing decentralized systems, open science, and blockchain were analyzed for perceived challenges and support for DAO-like ideas.

RESULTS

The comparative and theoretical assessment of DAO applicability in pharma research revealed key insights:

1. Alignment with Core Research Needs

DAO characteristics—transparency, immutable records, programmable rules—aligned well with the following pharmaceutical research requirements:

- Ensuring trial transparency and preventing data manipulation;
- Reducing administrative overhead in funding and milestone tracking;
- Enabling open collaboration while preserving attribution.

In all cases studied, DAOs offer structural improvements over centralized models, especially in fostering trust and auditability.

2. Proof-of-Concept Support in Early Technologies

Though no full DAO existed before 2015, the technical building blocks—Bitcoin, colored coins, Ethereum testnets—were sufficiently developed to enable early prototypes. Timestamping, decentralized identities, and tokenization could be configured for pharma research coordination, albeit with limitations.

Examples include:

- Bitcoin-based timestamping platforms like Proof of Existence;
- Colored coins for token representation of assets;
- Ethereum whitepaper's proposal for Turing-complete smart contracts.

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These tools, while primitive compared to later advancements, demonstrated theoretical feasibility for DAOs in controlled research environments.

3. Governance and Funding Opportunities

Tokenized voting systems offer a path to democratized funding allocation. In simulations, token holders could vote on which compound to prioritize or which open trial to fund, circumventing centralized grant committees. This could especially benefit underfunded or neglected diseases, where traditional markets fail.

However, potential issues were identified:

- Token distribution bias could reinforce power asymmetries;
- Lack of regulatory clarity hindered trust from public institutions;
- Community coordination mechanisms were immature before 2015.

4. Patient and Community Inclusion

DAO models hold the promise of giving patients voting rights or participation in research decisions—a revolutionary shift from traditional top-down clinical trials. The literature reviewed emphasized growing support for patient-centered research models, making DAOs a natural extension.

However, patient education and onboarding into DAO environments would require interface simplification, legal safeguards, and robust identity management—technologically challenging pre-2015.

5. Barriers to Real-World Implementation

While theoretically viable, real-world adoption before 2015 was hindered by:

- Immature smart contract development environments (e.g., Solidity was not fully operational);
- Absence of DAO-focused regulatory frameworks;
- Limited awareness of blockchain beyond cryptocurrencies;
- Lack of integration tools between lab systems and decentralized platforms.

Despite these limitations, growing academic and technical discourse suggested that early adopter ecosystems like open-source pharma communities—were ripe for DAO experimentation.

CONCLUSION

Decentralized Autonomous Organizations, as conceptualized before August 2015, offered a radical shift in structuring pharmaceutical research: from hierarchical, opaque, and proprietary systems toward transparent, participatory, and automated networks. By replacing gatekeepers with smart contracts and governance tokens, DAOs promised democratized research funding, real-time auditability of clinical trials, and broader community involvement in drug development.

This manuscript demonstrates that although technical and regulatory barriers limited real-world deployment, many of the fundamental ideas—open access, community-led science, blockchain-based transparency—were already gaining momentum. DAOs, though still embryonic, were a logical convergence of these trajectories.

Future pharmaceutical ecosystems could leverage DAO principles not only to address inefficiencies but also to foster ethical innovation, especially in neglected disease research and global collaborative trials. For stakeholders seeking to build trust, reduce costs, and decentralize knowledge, DAOs present a foundational model worth building upon.

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